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CRIMINAL DISCOVERY IN OKLAHOMA:
A CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
RODNEY J. UPHOFF*

Introduction
In Allen v. District Court,' the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals outlined
new procedures governing pretrial discovery in all state criminal cases.2 For the
past three years judges in Oklahoma have struggled to implement Allen's mandate
that pretrial discovery in criminal cases be "a two-way street."3 Unfortunately, the
Allen procedures have not led to the systemic improvements the court envisioned,
but instead have further snarled traffic in Oklahoma's criminal courts. The time has
arrived for the Oklahoma legislature to take up the challenge and construct an
efficient and fair criminal discovery code

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law. J.D., 1976, University of
Wisconsin; M.Sc., 1973, London School of Economics; B.A., 1972, University of Wisconsin. I wish to
thank Lori Ketner for her assistance in the preparation of this article. I would also like to thank Kelly
Beardslee, whose invaluable research assistance contributed significantly to this article.
1. 803 P.2d 1164 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990).
2. Allen did not make clear if these new procedures applied only in felony cases or if the decision
extended to all criminal cases. In Wilkerson v. District Court, 839 P.2d 659, 660 (Okla. Crim. App.
1992), the court expressly held that misdemeanor cases are governed by Allen.
3. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1164. The "two-way street" metaphor is taken from Justice Marshall's opinion
in Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470,475 (1973). Nonetheless, neither the Wardius decision nor the other
U.S. Supreme Court cases cited in Allen support the proposition that discovery procedures must be
symmetrical or that all statutorily mandated defense disclosure provisions are constitutionally inoffensive.
As the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently observed, "Mhe [discovery] requirements to
be placed on the State and a defendant are distinctly different ...." Richie v. Beasley, 837 P.2d 479,
480 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992). For a critical assessment of the constitutional problems with certain Allen
provisions requiring defense counsel's disclosures, see Rodney J. Uphoff, The New Criminal Discovery
Code in Oklahoma: A Two-Way Street in the Wrong Direction,44 OKLA. L. RE. 387 (1991).
4. There have been numerous bills introduced in recent years seeking to enact a criminal discovery
code. See David Lee, The Need for A New Criminal Discovery Code in Oklahoma State Courts
RequiringDisclosureof Investigative Reports to Defendants,60 OKLA. B.J. 2259 (1989). See infra notes
6, 96.
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This article first explores the Allen decision and the extent to which Allen
changed the law of criminal discovery in Oklahoma. Next, the article examines
some of the theoretical and practical problems with the Allen procedures as well as

the efforts of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals to address some of the
troublesome questions generated by Allen. Finally, the article discusses the need to
replace the Allen provisions with a legislative framework that facilitates pretrial

access to information and minimizes "trial ambush," but without compromising the
fair and efficient operation of the adversary system.
Allen's New Discovery Procedures

Since 1982, civil discovery in Oklahoma has been governed by a statutory
framework similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 Yet despite repeated
efforts, the Oklahoma legislature has never enacted a comprehensive code of

criminal discovery! Prior to Allen, very little discovery in criminal cases was7
mandated by statute. The prosecution was required by statute to endorse witnesses,
to provide the defense with sworn statements' and to give defense counsel a copy

of any relevant grand jury testimony.' The defense only had to notify the prosecution of an alibi defense" and of a mental illness or insanity defense." Neither the
prosecution nor the defense had the right to use interrogatories or depositions, the

discovery tools commonly utilized by civil practitioners.
Nevertheless, some criminal defendants prior to Allen were able to learn a

considerable amount about the State's case. In those instances in which the State's
witnesses could be persuaded to talk, such interviews often provided a major source
of information to the defense." In felony cases, the preliminary hearing also could

5. 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 3224-3237 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
6. Uphoff, supra note 3, at 389. In the 1993 legislative session several discovery bills failed. See
H.R. 1530, 44th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 1993) (provisions substantially tracked Allen by mandating State
and defense disclosures; empowered court to order sanctions for noncompliance); S. 117, 44th Leg., 1st
Sess. (Okla. 1993) (also specified disclosures as well as sanctions similar to those required by Allen).
7. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 303 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
8. Id. § 749.
9. Id. § 340.
10. Id. § 585.
11. Id. § 1176.
12. Locating and then persuading the State's witnesses to submit to an interview can be a timeconsuming and often fraitless venture. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. Lack of
investigative assistance, especially in misdemeanor cases, often places the burden on the defense lawyer
to conduct such interviews. Conducting one's own interviews, however, creates real danger that the
lawyer may become a nscessary witness and, therefore, precluded from ultimately representing the
defendant at trial. OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 3.7 (1993); see also ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUsTicE 4-4.3(e) (1991) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS] (stating that defense
counsel should avoid interviewing prospective witness except in presence of third person). Unfortunately,
defense counsel, especially a solo practitioner, may not have a viable alternative. Defense counsel has
a duty to provide competant representation which includes undertaking an adequate investigation. See
id. 4-4.1. The failure to ,.ttempt to interview crucial witnesses may constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel. See Chambers v. Armontrout, 907 F.2d 825, 828-31 (8th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
950 (1990).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol46/iss3/2

1993]

CRIMINAL DISCOVERY IN OKLAHOMA

be used to gain a fairly detailed look at much of the State's case. 3 Moreover,
defense lawyers who were fortunate enough to receive police reports gained perhaps
the best access to the State's case. Such access, however, was not required by law
but depended on the fairness and generosity of individual prosecutors. 4

Case law before Allen did require prosecutors to reveal certain evidence to the
defense. In a series of cases beginning in 1957 with State ex rel. Sadler v.
Lackey," the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals obligated prosecutors to make
pretrial disclosure of certain evidentiary aspects of their cases. Although neither
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals nor the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
a general constitutional right to discovery, 7 both courts relied on due process
concerns to grant defendants access to some of the prosecution's evidence in order
to allow defense counsel to adequately prepare for trial."
At the time of the Allen decision, therefore, a criminal defendant in Oklahoma
generally had the right to pretrial access to technical and scientific reports within
the prosecutor's possession and control. The defendant also was entitled to a

13. See Beaird v. Ramey, 456 P.2d 587, 589 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969) (stating that preliminary
hearing is for defendant's benefit in that it gives defendant the opportunity to discover the evidence to
be used against him at trial). Both prior to and since Allen, the preliminary hearing at times has been
a useful discovery vehicle. Yet, because a defendant has not been entitled to, and has rarely received,
police reports before the preliminary hearing, defense counsel frequently has been ill-prepared to
effectively utilize this hearing. Despite the systemic benefits of mandating some discovery before the
preliminary hearing - encouraging earlier resolution of cases, eliminating need for some preliminary
hearings, clarifying facts before hearing to allow for more efficient use of the hearing, minimize need
to call certain witnesses - the Allen court reiterated its previous position that a trial judge could not
order discovery before the preliminary hearing. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1169.
14. Prior to Allen, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals consistently held that reports generated
by police officers and other law enforcement agents were only discoverable if such reports contained
exculpatory material. See, e.g., Van White v. State, 752 P.2d 814, 819 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988). In a
post-Allen case, Amos v. District Court, 814 P.2d 502 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991), the court indicated that
pursuant to a defendant's discovery motion a district judge should review OSBI reports and determine
whether "the reports are relevant and discoverable in a criminal proceeding." Id. at 502. Amos certainly
does not mandate that all relevant police reports be turned over to the defense. But the decision also falls
to offer any real guidance as to when or why a relevant police report is not discoverable. Amos does
reaffirm the principal that all exculpatory material in an OSBI report must be disclosed to the defense.
For a discussion of the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, see infra notes 24-28, 118 and
accompanying text.
15. 319 P.2d 610 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957).
16. Lackey, 319 P.2d at 613. For a more detailed account of the law of discovery prior to Allen, see
Christen R. Blair, Oklahoma CriminalDiscovery After Allen, 28 TULSA L.J. 69 (1992); see also Uphoff,
supra note 3, at 388-99.
17. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (noting that "no general constitutional
right to discovery [exists] in a criminal case").
18. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985);
Moore v. State, 740 P.2d 731 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987).
19. McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (forensic report); Stafford v.
District Court, 595 P.2d 797, 799 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (autopsy report); Hamm v. State, 516 P.2d
825 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (ballistics report); Layman v. State, 355 P.2d 444, 447-51 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1960) (engineer's report); Moore, 740 P.2d at 731, 735-36 (chemist's report). But see Pierce v.
State, 786 P.2d 1255, 1263 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (holding that an expert's report need not disclose
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timely pretrial inspection of any physical evidence in the State's hands." In
addition, defense counsel had a right to obtain prior to trial a copy of the
defendant's own written statement and a summary of any oral statements the
defendant made to a law enforcement officer.2' Defense counsel also could require
the prosecutor to provide a copy of the criminal records of the State's witnessesY
Finally, the prosecutor was required to disclose at least ten days before trial (any
prosectuor's) intent to use "other crimes" or "bad acts" evidence pursuant to title 12,
section 2404 of the Oklahoma Statutes."
Since the 1963 landmark case of Brady v. Maryland,' prosecutors also were
obligated to turn over to the defense all exculpatory information or evidence known

to the prosecutor

Some Oklahoma prosecutors, consistent with the guidance

provided by the ABA Standards on the Prosecution Function, disclosed "all material
that is even possibly exculpatory "' and did so "at the earliest feasible opportunity."' Many prosecutors, however, took a very narrow view of what constituted
exculpatory evidence and only infrequently made pretrial disclosure of evidence on
Brady grounds.'

all of her opinions).
20. The prosecutor must provide timely access to physical evidence so that defense has a fair and
meaningful opportunity to conduct a competent examination of that evidence. See, e.g., McCarty, 765
P.2d at 1217 (hair samplrs).
21. See id. For a recent post-Allen decision reiterating that due process and fundamental fairness
require that an accused b, afforded a fair and adequate opportunity to make a competent independent
pretrial examination of physical evidence and technical reports, see Miller v. State, 809 P.2d 1317, 1319
(Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
22. See Stevenson v. State, 486 P.2d 646,650 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971), cert. denied,404 U.S. 1040
(1972).
23. Burks v. State, 594 P.2d 771, 774 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979); see also Freeman v. State, 767 P.2d
1354, 1357 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
24. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
25. Il at 87. Numerous Oklahoma cases have recognized the disclosure requirements mandated by
Brady. See, e.g., McDonald v. State, 553 P.2d 171 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976). In addition, the prosecutor's
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence is spelled out in ABA STANDARDS 3-3.11 (1992) and by
OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3.8(d) (1993). The OKLAHOMA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSnirLiTY DR7-103 (1984) also contained a similar obligation. The Oklahoma
Rules of Professional Conduct are codified at 5 OKLA. STAT. ch. 1, app. 3-A (1991).
26. ABA STANDARDm 3-62 commentary (1986).
27. ABA STANDARD.; 3-3.11 (1992).
28. The number of appellate cases raising Brady issues, in part, evinces the begrudging attitude of
many prosecutors regarding the disclosure of material that is arguably exculpatory. See, e.g., Bowen v.
Maynard, 799 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962 (1986). A few prosecutors actually hide
exculpatory evidence. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 538 N.Y.S,2d 677 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (overturning
conviction on grounds tha . prosecutor in murder-arson case failed to disclose expert testimony that fire
was not arson-related but result of electrical malfunction).
More commonly, how.aver, prosecutors simply misunderstand the true scope of their disclosure
obligation or adopt an attitude of selective ignorance. See infra note 121 and accompanying text. For
a further examination of the causes and consequences of the serious systemic problem of prosecutorial
nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence, see, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors,53 U. PIT.
L. REV. 393 (1992); Randclph N. Jonakait, The EthicalProsecutor'sMisconduct,23 CRIM. L. BULL. 550
(1987).
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Prior to Allen, then, criminal defendants had varied, but often limited, pretrial

access to the prosecutor's case. Oklahoma prosecutors had virtually no access to the
defenseicase. Defense counsel, of course, has no ethical or constitutional duty to
disclose inculpatory evidence to the prosecution

9

Indeed, prior to Allen, defense

counsel had no obligation to provide the prosecutor any details or information
whatsoever about the defendant's case, other than providing notice of an alibi or

insanity defense."
In the Allen decision, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals created radically
new disclosure obligations for defense counsel while at the same time only
minimally expanding the prosecutor's duty to disclose information about the State's
case. The court declared that the pretrial discovery procedure it was mandating "will
expedite the trial of criminal cases and will help alleviate the pressing problem of

pre-trial disclosure."'" The Allen procedures, however, have not had the desired
positive effect on the fair and efficient performance of the criminal justice system

in Oklahoma.
Before discussing Allen's impact, it is important to review what Allen actually
requires. According to Allen, the prosecutor shall, upon the defendant's request,

disclose all of the material and information within the prosecutor's possession or
control, including but not limited to:

29. Justice White eloquently summarized the special role the criminal defense lawyer plays in the
American adversary system:
Defense counsel need present nothing, even if he knows what the truth is. He need not
furnish any witnesses to the police, or reveal any confidences of his client, or furnish any
other information to help the prosecution's case. If he can confuse a witness, even a
truthful one, or make him appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his
normal course. Our interest in not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put the State
to its proof, to put the State's case in the worst possible light, regardless of what he thinks
or knows to be the truth. Undoubtedly there are some limits which defense counsel must
observe but more often than not, defense counsel will cross-examine a prosecution
witness, and impeach him if he can, even if he thinks the witness is telling the truth, just
as he will attempt to destroy a witness who he thinks is lying. In this respect, as part of
our modified adversary system and as part of the duty imposed on the most honorable
defense counsel, we countenance or require conduct which in many instances has little,
if any, relation to the search for truth.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
Although defense counsel may not conceal evidence, counsel is under no duty to divulge the location
of inculpatory evidence. Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1088 (1986). If defense counsel takes possession of physical evidence, however, counsel generally
has an ethical duty to turn over that evidence to the prosecution or the court even though the evidence
is adverse to the defense. ABA STANDARDS 4-4.6 (1991); see also CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHiCS § 3.5 (1986). For an excellent examination of various aspects of this difficult ethical issue, see
Norman Lefstein, IncriminatingPhysical Evidence, the Defense Attorney's Dilemma, and the Need for
Rules, 64 N.C. L. REv. 897 (1986).
30. See supra notes 10, 11.
31. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167. The court also observed that these criminal discovery procedures will
ensure that trials "will be a process to seek justice by providing the defendant and the State access to
appropriate pre-trial discovery material." Id. at 1169.
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(a) the names and addresses of witnesses, together with their relevant
oral, written or recorded statement, or summaries of same;
(b) any written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral
statements made by the accused or made by a co-defendant;
(c) any reports or statements made by experts in connection with the
particular case, including results of physical or mental examinations and
of scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons;
(d) any books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects,
buildings, or Iplaces which the prosecuting attorney intends to use in the
hearing or trial or which were obtained from or belong to the accused;
(e) any record of prior criminal convictions of the defendant, or of
any codefendant; and
(f) OSBI or FBI rap sheetlrecords check on any witness listed by the
State or the defense as a possible witness who will testify at trial."
Allen imposes very similar disclosure requirements on the defense. The defense
must disclose:
(1) (a) The names and addresses of witnesses, together with their
relevant oral, written or recorded statement, or summaries of same;
(b) the name and address of any witness, other than the defendant,
who will be called to show that the defendant was not present at the
time and place specified in the information [or indictment], together
with the Witnesses statement to that fact;
(c) the names and addresses of any witness the defendant will call,
other than himself, for testimony relating to any mental disease, mental
defect, or other condition bearing upon his mental state at the time the
offense was allegedly committed, together with the witnesses statement
of that fact, if the statement is redacted by the court to preclude disclosure of privileged communication ....
(2) Upon the prosecuting attorney's request after the time set by the
court, the defendant shall allow him access at any reasonable times and
in any reasonable manner to inspect, photograph, copy, or have
reasonable tests made upon any book, paper, document, photograph, or
tangible object which is within the defendant's possession or control and
which:
(a) the defendant intends to offer in evidence, except to the extent
that it contains any communication of the defendant; or
(b) is a report or statement as to a physical or mental examination or
scientific test or experiment made in connection with the particular case
prepared by and relating to the anticipated testimony of a person whom
the defendant intends to call as a witness, provided the report or

32. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167-68.
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statement is redacted by the court to preclude disclosure of privileged

communication

3

The Allen court went on to spell out the sanctions a trial court could utilize against

a party for noncompliance with a discovery order. A trial court could specifically
require either side to comply, grant additional time or a continuance, prohibit the
introduction of specific evidence or witnesses, dismiss the charges, or declare a
mistrial. Allen also contains a provision which gives a party facing a sanction
prohibiting the introduction of specific evidence or a witness the opportunity to
show good cause why that party failed to comply. 5
Allen's ProceduralGaps: A Flawed Framework
From the start, the Allen procedures were flawed. 6 Admittedly, the Oklahoma

Court of Criminal Appeals faced a daunting challenge in trying to draft a
comprehensive code of criminal discovery. 7 Nevertheless, gaps in the procedural
framework created by Allen have left many trial judges, prosecutors and defense
lawyers unsure as to how pretrial criminal discovery really is to work.
First, the Allen court left unclear whether the procedures it was mandating applied
in other than felony cases. The decision stated that the court was addressing "the
issue of the right of pre-trial discovery in a felony criminal case."3 The court
empowered a trial judge to issue a discovery order "at any stage of the proceedings
following the bindover. 39 Because bindovers occur only in felony cases, the
procedures outlined apparently applied only in such cases. Yet, the opinion ended
by indicating that the discovery procedures set forth were to apply "to all cases
pending in the district courts of the State of Oklahoma."'

33. Id. at 1168.
34. Id. at 1169. Additionally, in cases of prosecutorial noncompliance, the court can relieve the
defendant from making a required disclosure. Id.
35. Id.
36. The defense disclosures mandated by Allen raise significant constitutional questions. A full
discussion of the constitutional problems of compelling a criminal defendant to provide information and
assistance to the prosecution is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of these issues in the
context of Allen, see Uphoff, supra note 3, at 400-28. For a thorough and insightful discussion of the
constitutional problems of mandating defense disclosures, see Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the
Defense: Tilting the AdversarialBalance, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1567 (1986).

37. Given the difficulty of the task it could be argued that the court should have followed the course
suggested by Judge Lane in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Allen and the lead of the California
Supreme Court by leaving to the legislature the job of drafting such a code because of the "primacy of
the Legislature in the field of creating rules of criminal procedure." People v. Collie, 634 P.2d 534, 53940 (Cal. 1981); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (holding that the task of drafting broad
discovery rules is seemingly more appropriately tackled by legislative rather than the judicial branch).
On the other hand, legislative inaction may well have driven the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
to take up the challenge. See supra notes 4, 6 and accompanying text.
38. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167.
39. Id4
40. Id. at 1169.
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This confusion was largely eliminated in Wilkerson v. District Court,4' when the
court explicitly held that Allen applied to all criminal cases in Oklahoma district

courts, including misdemeanors.42 The court further noted that the only limitation

upon Allen's application in a criminal case was that any discovery orders in a felony
case must follow the bindover order.43 Subsequently, in Bourland v. State," the
court overturned a district court's refusal to apply the Allen procedures to an

acceleration hearin:g. 45 Accordingly, if counsel makes a proper discovery motion,

then a defendant facing an acceleration proceeding is entitled to the discovery
recognized by Allen.M It remains to be seen if Allen will be extended to include
4
certain municipal cases pending before a district court for a de novo hearing. 1
A more significant gap in the Allen framework is the absence of a well-defined
process for achieving the pretrial discovery mandated by the decision. The proce-

dures appear to be designed for the typical felony case. That is, after the bindover
and at the formal arraignment, the court will issue a discovery order with a

41. 839 P.2d 659 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
42. Id. at 660.
43. Id.
44. 848 P.2d 580 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
45. Id at 581. An Ecceleration hearing is a proceeding in which the prosecution attempts to revoke
a defendant's deferred sentence by showing that the defendant violated the conditions of his or her
probation. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 991c (Supp. 1993).
46. Bourland, 848 P.2d at 581.
47. Neither Allen nor any subsequent case indicates that the Allen procedures are to apply to
municipal cases. In Wilkerson, the court stated that the Allen procedures were to be applied to all
criminal cases in district courts. Wilkerson, 839 P.2d at 660. It is not clear, however, whether a
municipal case carrying a potential jail sentence that is appealed to a district court constitutes a criminal
case covered by Allen. See Wheatly v. State, 139 P.2d 809 (Okla. Crim. App. 1943) (holding that a
violation of a city ordinrmnce did not constitute a crime if the defendant's conduct did not also constitute
a violation of a state statute).
The issue is compliczted further by the fact that a defendant convicted in a municipal court has two
possible avenues of reiiew, dependent upon whether the municipal court is a court of record. A
conviction in a court of record - currently only the municipal courts in Oklahoma and Tulsa County
are courts of record - is appealable to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals pursuant to title 18,
§ 1051 of the Oklahoma Statutes, and Oklahoma Criminal Appeals Rule 1.2(1). Clearly, if such a
defendant has not obtained discovery prior to the municipal court trial, the opportunity and right to do
so is lost since the appeal goes directly to the appellate court.
Alternatively, a defendant convicted in a municipal court which is not of record is allowed to appeal
to district court and provided a de novo hearing. 11 OKLA. STAT. §§ 27-129 (1991). Since the case is
now in district court, Wilkerson suggests that the parties are entitled to the discovery mandated by Allen.
Wilkerson, 839 P.2d at 660.
Such a reading raises two important issues. First, the holdings in Wilkerson and Bourland (providing
that Allen applies to misdemeanors and acceleration hearings) do not resolve the question as to whether
all cases in district court are governed by Allen. Second, extending the right to criminal discovery only
to those municipal defendants who initially were convicted in a court not of record seems to treat
similarly situated persons differently. This raises a serious question of fairness and equality in
administering justice. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest
for Truth?, 1963 VASH. U. L.Q. 279, 282 [hereinafter Brennan, Quest for Truth?]. Arguably, sound
policy dictates that no fo'mal discovery be mandated in any municipal court cases, but that police reports
be freely provided to all municipal defendants to ensure fair notice of the charges against them,
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timetable ensuring that both sides enjoy timely access to discoverable material.
Problems are to be sorted out at least ten days before trial. Theoretically, the parties
will be prepared, a timely trial held and the smooth administration of justice served.
Unfortunately, felony cases frequently get sidetracked. Witness problems, delays
in obtaining expert reports, motions to withdraw, illness, and court congestion are
among a myriad of reasons why cases do not proceed as smoothly in practice as the
court might hope. Moreover, the process described in Allen does not translate well
when applied to misdemeanor cases. Many defendants charged with misdemeanors

appear at their initial appearance or arraignment without counsel. In Cleveland
County, for example, the next scheduled court appearance in a misdemeanor case
after a defendant's initial appearance is the sounding or call docket. Thus, once

defense counsel is retained or appointed, counsel must file a discovery motion and
then secure a motion date for a discovery hearing. In many instances, counsel
will be appearing at the sounding docket without having received any discovery
from the State or having had an opportunity to schedule a discovery hearing. In
view of the fact that trials in Cleveland County are set three to four weeks after the
sounding docket, defendants have little time to obtain their discovery order, receive

the requested discovery, respond to the prosecution's motion for discovery and
finalize trial preparation - all at least ten days before trial or risk serious sanctions

for noncompliance. As a result, cases get continued to the next call docket or the
lawyers go to trial without discovery and, frequently, without adequate preparation.49
The Allen procedures hamper rather than facilitate timely access to pretrial

information by failing to provide a simple but ordered process for obtaining

48. In some cases, the lawyer will enter a case only a week or so before the sounding docket,
leaving counsel unable to schedule a hearing before the sounding docket.
49. The most plausible explanation for a defense lawyer not filing a discovery motion is that the
State has voluntarily made all of the information and evidence mandated by Allen available.
Occasionally, defense counsel may decline to pursue formal discovery because counsel feels that the
defense stands to give up more than will be gained if a reciprocal discovery order is granted. In many
cases, however, counsel's failure to seek discovery to which the defense is entitled opens counsel up to
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Chambers v. Armontrout, 907 F.2d 825, 828 (8th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied,498 U.S. 950 (1990). The decision to interview a witness is not a decision related
to trial strategy, but a question of adequate preparation. The Chambers court stated that a defense
attorney has "a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes
particular investigations unnecessary." Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984));
see also Mason v. Balcom, 534 F.2d 1407 (5th Cir. 1976), reh'g denied, 534 F.2d 1407 (5th Cir. 1976)
(holding that a defense lawyer has duty to investigate even when the client just wants to plead guilty);
ABA STANDARDS 4-4.1(a) (1991).
In Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986), the court found that defense counsel's failure to
conduct discovery constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court, citing earlier decisions, stated
that "such a complete lack of pretrial preparation puts at risk both the defendant's right to an 'ample
opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution' and the reliability of the adversarial testing process." Id.
at 385 (citation omitted) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942)).
Unquestionably, a defense lawyer's failure to conduct a proper investigation or to adequately prepare
also violates OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.1 (1993). See, e.g., In re Lewis, 445
N.E.2d 987 (Ind. 1983); Florida Bar v. Morales, 366 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1978).
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discovery. It makes little sense to insist upon a judicial order as a necessary
triggering step in the discovery process. Rather, the prosecution should first be
required to provide certain specified discovery material merely upon the defense's
request without the need for court intervention.' Once such discovery is provided,
the prosecution should then be able to demand the discovery to which the prosecutor
is entitled. A discovery hearing and order should only be necessary if a disagreement develops over a specific request.
In addition, the Allen procedures do not clearly specify that defense disclosures

must follow instead of being exchanged simultaneously with the prosecution's
discovery. In the vast majority of cases, most of the State's investigation has been

completed prior to charges being issued. The prosecution has identified its
witnesses, knows generally what those witnesses will say, and possesses sufficient
admissible evidenc.e to support its theory of the case.5 There is no sound policy
reason for not requiring the prosecutor to make early disclosure of the material
mandated by Allen.52 Early prosecutorial disclosure will foster the prompt
resolution of cases and, if cases are going to be tried, the preparation of both sides

for that trial."
If a prosecutor is permitted to substantially delay turning over discovery material
to the defense, defense counsel's investigation and trial preparation will be sorely
hampered. In turn, defense counsel will not be able to comply in any meaningful

way with the required disclosures that the defense must make. Hence, either the
trial will be delayed, the prosection will not receive the requisite disclosures or the
defense will suffer one of the sanctions provided by Allen.
At present, Allen affords the trial judge too much flexibility and too little
guidance. The trial judge may issue a discovery order at virtually any time
compelling compliance according to a schedule the judge deems appropriate as long

50. Compare, for example, FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(A), which provides that the prosecution upon
request provide the deferse certain discovery material without the need for a motion and court order. See
also Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery Abuse Revisited: Some Specific Proposals to Amend the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 U.S.F. L. REv. 189, 198-201 (1992) (stating that judges lack time and
inclination to closely supervise and resolve discovery disputes, so judicial procrastination increases
delay).
51. It is improper for a prosecutor even to file or permit the continued pendency of charges in the
absence of sufficient admissible evidence. ABA STANDARDS 3-3.9 (1992). It follows, then, that the
prosecutor's superior access to information about a case is magnified during the earliest stages of the
case. See Gershman, supra note 28, at 449. For a discussion of the State's inherent advantages in
marshalling evidence, see Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470,476 n.9 (1973). See infra notes 54-57, 10104 and accompanying text.
52. Early discovery facilitates the goals of a fair and efficient discovery system. See infra note 116.
53. See Cary Clennon, Pre-Trial Discovery of Witness Lists: A Modest Proposal to Improve the
Administration of Criminal Justice in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, 38 CATH. U. L.

Rev. 641 (1989) (granting defendant improved pretrial access leads to more informed pleas without
adversely affecting the State's ability to obtain convictions). More importantly, in those cases in which
the defendant has been erroneously charged, early disclosure may allow defense counsel to conduct a
more prompt investigation and secure quicker dismissals of unwarranted prosecutions. See Brennan,
Quest for Truth?, supra note 47, at 279. Additionally, broad discovery would benefit prosecutors by
increasing the numbers cof cases disposed of without the necessity of trial, Id. at 287.
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as all discovery issues are resolved at least ten days before trial. As a result, trial

judges are interpreting and applying Allen in very different ways.
Furthermore, the Allen procedures gloss over the significant burdens that defense
lawyers confront in meeting Allen's disclosure requirements, especially in a timely
manner. Few criminal defendants can afford to retain private investigators to assist
defense counsel.' Defense counsel often must conduct his or her own investi-

gation. Because defense counsel generally does not get involved until weeks, or
even longer, from the date of the offense, counsel faces greater difficulty in locating
witnesses, increased instances of faded memories and a reduced chance of
uncovering favorable evidence." Defense counsel encounters the same reluctant
witnesses the State does, but counsel for the criminally accused finds it even harder
to persuade those witnesses to submit to an interview.' In addition, the defense's
inability to gain pretrial access to the prosecution's case is exacerbated if the State's
witnesses are "encouraged" to exercise their right to refuse to be interviewed.'

54. Numerous commentators and studies have decried the inadequate resources and extremely
limited investigative assistance provided lawyers defending the poor. See, e.g., NORMAN LEFSTEIN,
CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR: METHODS AND PROGRAMS FOR PROVIDING LEGAL
REPRESENTATION AND THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE FINANCING (1982). Yet, it is also clear that even those

persons who are able to retain counsel can rarely afford investigators and other experts. See William J.
Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 781, 794-95 (1988). The absence of investigative

assistance may seriously compromise the quality of counsel's representation. "The best lawyer in the
world cannot competently defend an accused person if the lawyer cannot obtain existing evidence crucial
to the defense, e.g., if the defendant cannot pay the fee of an investigator to find a pivotal witness or a
necessary document .... " United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565, 572 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 352 U.S. 565 (1957); see also Brennan, Quest for Truth?, supra note 47, at 286.

Unfortunately, it also is clear that defense lawyers in Oklahoma have struggled without adequate
resources to defend indigents charged with crimes. See FINAL REPORT OF THE SPANGENBERG GROUP ON
OKLAHOMA INDIGENT DEFENSE (1988).

55. See Genego, supranote 54, at 795,797. The Court in Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686
(1992), cited earlier cases recognizing that impairment of one's defense is a form of prejudice because
of "time's erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony." Id. at 2692-93. For an excellent discussion
of the importance of a timely and thorough defense investigation, see ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL
MANUAL 5 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES §§ 106-122 (1988).

56. Many people simply do not want to get involved, especially if they think they may have to go
to court. But even reluctant witnesses tend to feel compelled to talk to the police. Witnesses do not feel
similarly compelled to talk with defense counsel or a defense investigator. For a discussion of the
additional pressures which the State can bring to bear to encourage cooperation, see Gershman, supra
note 28, at 416-17.
57. See Brennan, Quest for Truth?, supra note 47, at 286. The Oklahoma Rules of Professional
Conduct forbids a prosecutor from instructing a witness not to talk to the defense. OKLAHOMA RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3A(f) (1993); see also ABA STANDARDS 3-3.1(d) (1992) (stating that

prosecution should not discourage or obstruct communication between witness and defense); ABA CTR.
FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIY, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 401-02

(2d ed. 1992); United States v. Lopez, 989 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1993).
On the other hand, a prosecutor may explain to a witness that he or she is free to refuse to speak with
the defense should the witness so desire. Some prosecutors provide this explanation in a manner so as
to discourage witnesses from talking with the defense. This practice has been condemned. See ABA
STANDARDS 3-3.1 (d) (1992); United States v. Carrigan, 840 F.2d 599 (10th Cir. 1986); Gregory v. United
States, 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966); State v. Simmons, 203 NAV.2d 887 (Wis. 1973). A defense
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Again, defense counsel's investigation and preparation is more difficult in a
misdemeanor case because the defense has no right to a preliminary hearing in such
cases. A prelimintxy hearing gives defense counsel a significant preview of the
State's case even though the prosecutor usually seeks to achieve a bindover while
disclosing as little of the State's case as possible. Defense counsel, on the other
hand, uses this hearing to discover as much information as possible about the
prosecutor's case.s Because counsel does not have access to police reports or other
discovery before the preliminary hearing, the defense often will only learn the broad
parameters of the prosecution's case at this hearing. Moreover, the preliminary
hearing seldom reveals much about the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses,
their motivations Cr their biases. This type of impeachment testimony must be
generated by defense counsel's own efforts. Assuming that such evidence is
uncovered, does Allen require that it be disclosed?
The answer is not as straightforward as it first would seem. Allen, as clarified by
Richie v. Beasley," requires the defense to disclose only those witnesses "whom
the defense intends to call at trial."' Impeachment witnesses may or may not be
called, depending cn the testimony of the prosecution's witness. For example, if a
prosecution witnes3 admits certain facts on cross-examination, testimony of an
impeachment witness may be unnecessary. Counsel's intention to call such an
impeachment witness, therefore, is conditioned on the State's case-in-chief and the
testimony of the prosecution's witnesses.
A fundamental problem with the defense disclosures mandated by Allen is that,
aside from affimiative defenses where the defense bears the burden of production,
the presentation of the defense case is usually conditioned on the testimony actually
elicited in the State's case-in-chief. It follows, therefore, that the defense case
necessarily consists largely of testimony offered to rebut the State's case. It is
difficult to provide pretrial notice of an intent to use what is really rebuttal evidence
until the defense actually hears the State's witnesses testify and determines the need
for defense testimony. 6

lawyer also is subject to discipline for advising a person other than a client not to talk with the
prosecution unless the person is a relative, employee or other agent of a client and the lawyer reasonably
believes the person's in.erests will not suffer as a result of refusing to talk. OKLAHOMA RULES OF
PROFFSSIONAL CONDucr Rule 3.4(f) (1993); ABA STANDARDS 4-4.3(d) (1991); see also United States
v. Fayer, 523 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1975) (affirming a defense lawyer's conviction for advising a represented
witness not to voluntarily appear before a grand jury investigating lawyer's client).
58. Beaird v. Ramey, 456 P.2d 587, 589 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969) (stating that the defense has a
right to call witnesses ard produce evidence at a preliminary hearing where discovery is an appropriate
goal); see also Wyrick v. District Court, 839 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (following Beaird
and citing 22 OKLA. STAT. §§ 257, 259 in holding that both the defense and prosecutor may subpoena

witnesses to testify at preliminary hearing).
59. 837 P.2d 479 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
60. Id. at 480.
61. As Justice Black correctiy insisted, "[a]ny lawyer who has actually tried a case knows that,
regardless of the amount of pretrial preparation, a case looks far different when it is actually being tried
than when it is only being thought about." Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 109 (1970) (Black, J.,
concurring in part and di;senting in part). Because it is so difficult to predict what witnesses will actually
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The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has explicitly recognized this problem
62
in holding that the prosecution need not endorse rebuttal witnesses. As the court
observed, "[T]he State was not required to give pretrial notice because the State
cannot know with certainty prior to trial what evidence may become relevant for
rebuttal."' Unquestionably, there will be many cases in which the prosecutor will
not ascertain, until defense witnesses actually testify, that a need exists to call a
specific person or elicit particular testimony. The ebb and flow of trial practice
makes it impossible for even the most prepared prosecutor in many cases to
anticipate in advance of trial all the testimony that will be needed to respond to the
other side's case.
Yet, it is hard to fathom why the task is any easier for the defense. Indeed, given
the imbalance of investigatory resources and the limited discovery provided even
under Allen, defense counsel often will not learn critical facts about the
prosecution's case until the State's witnesses actually testify at trial. To then limit
the defense to witnesses identified in the defendant's discovery response raises
serious questions of fairness as well as possible violations of the defendant's right
to the effective assistance of counsel, compulsory process, and the right to present
a defense.'

say or how they will respond on cross-examination, it is hard to know with any certainty what testimony
will be needed to rebut one's opponent or corroborate one's own witnesses. Thus, limiting a defendant
to calling only those witnesses disclosed before the defendant received full disclosure of all the State's
witnesses, including potential rebuttal witnesses, may well run afoul of the due process concerns
identified in Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 608-13 (1972) (recognizing that a state rule requiring
defendant to testify first at trial before the defense has an opportunity to evaluate actual worth of defense
evidence violates due process). But see Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1989) (recognizing that under
some circumstances it is constitutionally permissible to preclude defense testimony as sanction for
discovery violation).
62. Honeycutt v. State, 834 P.2d 993 (Okla.Crim. App. 1992), is the latest in a series of cases
holding that the State need not endorse a witness if the testimony given is clearly rebuttal. Rebuttal
testimony may be offered to "explain, repel, counteract, disprove, or destroy facts given in evidence by
an adverse party, as well as to clarify a disputed point." Lavicky v. State, 632 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1981).
63. Honeycutt, 834 P.2d at 997; see also Freeman v. State, 681 P.2d 84, 85 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984)
(observing that "the State cannot know with certainty prior to trial what evidence may become relevant
for rebuttal").
64. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972); Scott
v. State, 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974). For a further discussion of the constitutional ramifications of
compelling defense disclosures which ease the State's burden of proof, adversely affect defense strategy
or restrict the defendant's ability to present testimony not previously disclosed, see generally Mosteller,
supra note 36; Uphoff, supra note 3, at 406-25. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), does recognize
that the compulsory process clause does not constitute an absolute bar to the preclusion of a defense
witness as a sanction for violating a discovery provision. Id. at 401. Nonetheless, it also is clear the
preclusion of defense witnesses or testimony is the most severe sanction which should be reserved for
cases involving flagrant discovery violations. Id. at 416-17; see also Wilkerson v. District Court, 839
P.2d 659, 661 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992). For a recent case in which the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals agreed that preclusion of defense witnesses would be inappropriate because defense counsel's
actions, not the defendant's, had prevented compliance with a discovery order, see Morgan v. District
Court, 831 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992). For a more detailed look at the arguments against
penalizing a defendant for the failings of defense counsel, see John W. Heiderscheitt, Taylor v. Illinois:
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The Allen decision never addressed the issue of rebuttal witnesses. According to
Richie v. Beasley, Allen requires a prosecutor to provide the defense "the names and
addresses of all persons known to the State having knowledge of relevant facts or

information about the case."'

Such a broad requirement certainly could be

interpreted to include all rebuttal witnesses because they are persons with relevant
information.' On the other hand, until the defense disclosures are made, the State
may not even have known about or have located certain rebuttal witnesses. Thus,
it is unlikely that Allen would be read to require the disclosure of such witnesses
unless the prosecutor has a continuing duty to supplement his or her initial
discovery response.
Allen does not clearly define the duties of each side to provide supplemental
discovery. The defense is required to inform the prosecutor if the defense
subsequently gains possession or control of evidence or a report the defense intends
to introduce at trial.' Other than this specific continuing disclosure obligation,
however, Allen is silent about the parties' need to supply additional information and
material to the other side as such information is uncovered. Although such
continuing disclosure obligations may be warranted and sound policy," the Allen
decision leaves unanswered the question of the trial judge's authority to impose and
enforce a duty on both the prosecution and the defense to provide supplemental
disclosures to their initial discovery responses.'

Thus, neither Allen nor any subsequent case clearly indicates whether a prosecutor
is, in fact, now required to disclose rebuttal witnesses." If the prosecutor can avoid
identifying such witnesses and need not provide any disclosure about such rebuttal

The New and Not-So-N.,rv Approach to Defense Witness Preclusion Sanctions for Criminal Discovery
Violations, 23 GA. L. REV. 479, 498-504 (1989).
65. Richie, 837 P.2d at 480.
66. Some rebuttal testimony goes only to impeach the credibility of the defendant or defense
witnesses and may not go directly to the facts of the case. Arguably, then, it is not "information about
the case." Such a narro-w interpretation seems unduly strained. If impeachment by a rebuttal witness is
allowed, it must be beause it is relevant. Richie, therefore, seemingly requires prosecutors to identify
and to disclose to the Cefense all potential witnesses with relevant impeachment testimony. Id. This
obligation, however, is riot clearly defined in Allen. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
67. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168.
68. See ABA STA:DARDS 11-4.2 & cmt. (1986).
69. The Federal Rtles of Criminal Procedure impose a specific duty on both parties to supplement
discovery stating that "if, prior to or during the trial, a party discovers additional evidence... which is
subject to discovery... such party shall promptly notify the other party." FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(c). Allen
contains no similar provision. Nevertheless, the prosecution's obligation to turn over Brady material is
a continuing one and extends even after the defendant's trial. Bowen v. State, 715 P.2d 1093, 1099
(Okla. Crim. App. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 911 (1985) (holding that throughout the course of trial
evidence may be discovered which puts prosecution on notice of duty to disclose such evidence to the
defense sua sponte).
70. In Allen v. State, 862 P.2d 487 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993), the court reaffirmed its position that
the decision to admit rebuttal testimony is within the trial court's discretion. The court noted that the
defendant complained be was not given "proper notice" of the rebuttal witness' testimony. Id. at 492.
The decision, however, did not directly address the question whether the Allen procedures as modified
by Richie require the prosecutor to give pretrial notice of any potential rebuttal witness together with a
summary of that person's statement.
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testimony, the Allen procedures leave the defense open to increased ambush under
the guise of rebuttal testimony. Indeed, given the court's broad definition of rebuttal
testimony, 7' a clever prosecutor merely could designate certain witnesses as rebuttal
and thereby "hide" a significant part of the State's case from the defense.
It is very difficult to square Allen's increased defense disclosure obligations with
the proposition that the State need not disclose rebuttal testimony especially in light
of the State's burden of proof and the constitutional protections traditionally afforded
criminal defendants in the American adversarial system of criminal justice.' Put
simply, allowing the State to keep its rebuttal witnesses secret gives the prosecution
an unfair, impermissible tactical advantage thereby offending the balance of forces
central to the adversary system.' If the Allen procedures do not mandate that a
prosecutor disclose intended rebuttal testimony, the procedures violate due process

in the same way that the alibi rule did in Wardius v. Oregon.74 "It is fundamentally
unfair to require a defendant to divulge the details of his own case while at the
same time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the very
pieces of evidence which he disclosed to the State."'
Perhaps the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals expects trial judges to compel
prosecutors to reveal rebuttal witnesses and rebuttal material in a timely manner and
to preclude prosecutors from using rebuttal witnesses to surprise the defense.
Certainly the court's conclusion in Richie v. Beasley that the disclosure requirements
are disfinctly different for the State and the defense such that the prosecution must
disclose all persons with relevant facts while the defense need only identify intended

witnesses supports such action by the trial judge.7 Yet, in a recent decision, Allen

71. See, e.g., Wooldridge v. State, 659 P.2d 943,947 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (stating that "rebuttal
testimony may be offered to explain, repel, disprove or contradict facts given in evidence by an adverse
party, regardless of whether such evidence might have been introduced in the case in chief and regardless
of whether the testimony is somewhat cumulative").
72. For a summary of the basic principles underlying the American adversary system of criminal
justice, see WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAm, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.6 (1985); see also
DAVID LUBIN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 58-63 (1988) (stating that constitutional
rights afford defendants little real protection in light of harsh realities of overburdened system and that
adversary system is designed to handicap the State in order to check abuses of power and protect civil
liberties of all).
As Justice Black observed, the adversary system and the constitutional protections granted all
defendants do require that the State shoulder a difficult burden in establishing guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Undoubtedly,
That task is made more difficult by the Bill of Rights, and the Fifth Amendment may be
one of the most difficult of the barriers to surmount. The Framers decided that the
benefits to be derived from the kind of trial required by the Bill of Rights were well worth
any loss in 'efficiency' that resulted.
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 113-14 (1970) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 471-74 (1973).
74. In Wardius the Supreme Court struck down an Oregon notice of alibi statute that forced the
defense to disclose its alibi witnesses without requiring the prosecutor to respond by identifying witnesses
who would rebut that alibi. Id.
75. Id. at 476.
76. Richie, 837 P.2d at 480.
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v. State,' the court brushed aside the defendant's complaint that he was not given
proper notice of rebuttal testimony. Without directly addressing the issue, the
court merely restated its previous position that the admission of rebuttal testimony
lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge. 8 As a result, trial judges may
well hesitate to preclude the State's use of undisclosed rebuttal testimony even
though defendant's are ambushed by such testimony.
On the other hand, if rebuttal witnesses need now be identified and appropriate
disclosures made, prosecutors will face problems similar to those facing the
defense. In particular, it may be impossible for a prosecutor to make timely
disclosure of all the State's rebuttal testimony in response to defense disclosures
made shortly before trial. Again this will lead to delay or the State being unfairly
precluded from calling a witness discovered on the eve of trial.
Nonetheless, it is far better to mandate disclosure of rebuttal witnesses as soon
as discovered, and, if necessary, to grant a pretrial or even midtrial continuance,
than to allow the prosecutor to surprise the defense with undisclosed rebuttal
witnessesY To permit the prosecutor broad use of a rebuttal witness exception
to Allen's disclosure obligations is to provide the State a significant, albeit
constitutionally offensive, tactical advantage." This rebuttal exception not only
subjects criminal defendants to an increased risk of ambush at trial, it will
aggravate the already growing number of discovery issues on appeal."'
The related problems of the defendant providing a timely, detailed sumtnary of
all proposed defense testimony, primarily rebuttal in nature, and of the prosecutor
in turn giving timely notice of all the State's rebuttal testimony reflect the
fundamental shortcoming of the Allen decision. Allen represents a bold but
unsuccessful effort to reorder the criminal trial process in Oklahoma so that it
more closely resembles the civil system. In theory, then, the court's new
procedures were designed to "expedite the trial of criminal cases" and to ensure
"a process to seek justice" by providing each side access to pretrial discovery
2
material.
The Allen court's attempt to dramatically alter the nature and the dynamics of
criminal practice simply is not warranted. First, the Allen court's emphasis on
creating procedures to expedite trials is misplaced. The vast majority of criminal

77. 862 P.2d 487 (Okla.Crim. App. 1993). This case affirms the conviction of the defendant whose
case prompted the decision creating the Allen procedures.
78. Id. at 492.
79. See Wooldridge v. State, 659 P.2d 943, 947 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (recognizing that "if
an
unendorsed witness' te;timony will require a defendant to produce additional evidence or other rebuttal
witnesses, the defendant is entitled to a continuance of sufficient time to prepare to defend against the
rebuttal testimony").
80. See supra nota 73 and accompanying text.
81. Ironically, the court addressed the "pressing problem of pretrial disclosures" and enacted the
Allen procedures in part because the court "is continually confronted with issues on appeal relating to
compliance with pretrial discovery." Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167. The Allen procedures have increased, not
reduced, discovery issues for trial judges and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.
82. Id. at 1167-69.
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cases settle."3 Although improved trial preparation is a worthy goal, discovery
procedures must, above all, facilitate the prompt and fair resolution of cases and
ensure quick and easy access to information with as little need for judicial
intervention as possible.' The flawed Allen procedures, especially the need for
a discovery order, hinder timely access to discoverable material."5
In addition, the Allen disclosure requirements are part of an incomplete
framework which serves to encourage each side to minimize the information
provided to one's opponent. Although the court mandated that each side make
certain disclosures, it did not provide the parties the discovery tools needed to
follow up on those initial disclosures. Hence, a prosecutor or defense lawyer can
avoid turning over a witness statement by instead providing a brief, but not
terribly informative, summary.86
These superficial summaries do provide notice that a particular person will
testify, but they do not enable a party to readily discover what the opponent's
witnesses will say. Unlike civil practice, neither the State nor the defense can use
interrogatories or dispositions to probe for details concerning what the other side's
witnesses know and are likely to say at trial. Without such tools, Allen does not
ensure substantial pretrial access to the testimony to be adduced at trial by the
other side. 7
Furthermore, it is unrealistic to expect that either party will provide a complete
and detailed account of the anticipated testimony of each witness to be called.88

83. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 72, § 20.1.
84. ABA STANDARDS 11-1.1 (1986).
85. Both discovery bills introduced in the 1993 session of the Oklahoma legislature contained
procedures which substantially tracked Allen. See H.R. 1530, 44th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 1993); S. 117,
44th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 1993). Both bills, however, allowed the defense access to statements and
reports, including OSBI reports, in the prosecutor's possession prior to the preliminary hearing. Such a
provision would significantly improve defense counsel's timely access to information and increase the
likelihood of informed plea bargaining before the preliminary hearing.
86. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1167-68. Moreover, the well-documented problems and abuses in the civil
system suggest that it is highly unlikely, without substantial effort and cost, that most advocates will
provide helpful and meaningful summaries to their adversaries. See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Civil
Effectiveness, Its PrincipalProblemsand Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND.
Discovery: Lawyers' Views of lts
REs. J. 787, 829, 836-38 [hereinafter Brazil, Lawyers' Views]; Gerald R. Powell, The Docket Movers:
A Critique of ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 1 J. AM. BOARD TRIAL
ADVOC. 1, 14-15 (1991).
87. This does not mean, however, that it is desirable to actually provide those tools or to mandate
more expansive discovery in criminal cases. See infra notes 98, 100 and accompanying text. But see
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth? A Progress
Report, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 8(1990) [hereinafter Brennan, ProgressReport] (arguing that it is desirable
to give judges the discretion to order discovery depositions in appropriate cases).
88. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 1, State ex rel. Wideman v. Beekman, 839 P.2d 661
(Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (No. 0 92-0907), in which the prosecutor sought a writ to direct the district
court to order defense counsel to provide "acomplete and accurate summary of the specific testimony
to be offered by each witness for the defendant." Although the writ was granted, defense counsel was
ordered only to provide the relevant oral, written or recorded statements or summaries of the same, not
a complete account of the'witnesses' entire proposed testimony. Wideman, 839 P.2d at 662. Allen's
mandate that a summary of a statement be provided does not render any support for the unworkable
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The realities of criminal trial practice - understaffed prosecutors' offices with too
many cases, most of which must be and are plea-bargained,89 frequent problems
locating and securing the cooperation of witnesses," and the late nature of much
prosecutorial trial preparation once a case has been identified as going to trial make it extremely unlikely that prosecutors could ever provide defense lawyers
detailed scripts of their witnesses' testimony. Given that fact, it is constitutionally
offensive to mandate that the defense provide such detailed summaries of the
testimony of defense witnesses.9
Unquestionably, the Allen procedures have improved the prosecutor's trial
preparation. The State now has the right to learn in advance about the existence
of defense witnesses. Even though defense witnesses summaries may be brief, the
prosecutor still learns the evidence intended to be introduced by the defense at
trial.' In many cases, especially when law enforcement agents are then able to
interview defense witnesses, the prosecutor is less likely to be surprised by, and
more ready to challenge, defense testimony.
It is highly questionable, however, that the defendant's access to pretrial
information has really increased under Allen. As already noted, the prosecutor's
duty to disclose rebuttal witnesses is unsettled.93 Police reports, except those
containing exculpatory material, need not be turned over if the prosecutor chooses
to rely on witness summaries. 4 Although trial judges should be requiring
prosecutors to turn over the names and addresses of all persons with relevant
information about the defendant's case, not simply the names of the State's
intended witnesses, it is unclear to what extent this requirement is currently being
enforced. As to the other prosecutorial disclosures called for by Allen, the
defendant already could obtain most of this information under existing case
law.9" Allen, therefore, has not significantly enhanced a defendant's pretrial
access to the State's evidence or facilitated defense counsel's trial preparation.

proposition that either counsel must give to the other side a "complete" statement. See supra note 86.

89. See supra note 83.
90. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
91. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475 (1973) ("The State may not insist that trials be run
as 'a search for the truth' so far as defense witnesses are concerned, while maintaining 'poker game'
secrecy for its own witnesses.").
92. Allen requires such disclosure pursuant to 2(a) & (b) of its mandated procedures. Allen, 803 P.2d
at 1168.
93. See supra notes 62-63, 65-66, 70-75 and accompanying text.
94. See Fritz v. State, 811 P.2d 1353, 1358 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (stating that unswom
statements of witnesse: in police reports need not be disclosed). See supranote 14. Although prosecutors
may choose to turn over police reports to comply with Allen and Richie, some prosecutors will opt only
to provide summaries of witnesses statements but not investigative reports. Police reports generally
provide a more useful summary of information than a prosecutor's sanitized summary of a statement a
witness gave to the police. Nonetheless, police reports rarely contain a complete and accurate account
of the witness' knowledge of an incident or the circumstances surrounding an incident.
95. See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
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Replacing Allen: The Need for Legislative Action
It is time for the Oklahoma legislature to assume the responsibility for creating
a statutory framework to replace the Allen procedures. Unfortunately, the bills
introduced in the 1993 legislative session substantially track the Allen procedures.'
Although the Allen procedures should be replaced, the answer does not lie in
creating a more structured code allowing for even greater discovery. Nor should the
parties be provided more discovery tools. Rather, the new procedures must be
simple, fair, and largely free of judicial supervision.' In short, the legislature

should not follow the Allen court's lead and try to make the criminal system more
like the civil system.
Neither the Allen procedures nor last session's legislative equivalents will
efficiently and effectively produce the desired goals of evenhanded pretrial access

to information and adequately prepared lawyers. Without significantly reworking
or adding to the Allen procedures, Allen's incomplete framework provides too much
opportunity for gamesmanship and ambush. But the solution is not to add costly

procedural mechanisms so as to restructure the criminal system making it more like
the civil system. Simply stated, mandating more discovery will not produce more
justice."3

96. See supranote 6. It is not surprising that House Bill 1530 bears a considerable resemblance to
Allen in view of the fact that Judge Lumpkin of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals served as the

chairperson of an Oklahoma Bar Association Criminal Law Committee formed to draft the legislation
which ultimately became House Bill 1530.
97. For a proposed Oklahoma criminal discovery code modeled on the ABA Standards,see Uphoff,
supra note 3, at 431-41.
98. Indeed, the adversarial and competitive nature of trial practice makes it more likely that
formalizing criminal discovery will lead to more gamesmanship rather than justice. As Wayne Brazil
insists:
The unarticulated assumption underlying the modem discovery reform movement was that
the gathering and sharing of evidentiary information should (and would) take place in an
essentially nonadversarial environment. That assumption was not well made. Instead of
reducing the sway of adversary forces in litigation and confining them to the trial stage,
discovery has greatly expanded the arenas in which those forces can operate. It also has
provided attorneys with new weapons, devices, and incentives for the adversary
gamesmanship that discovery was designed to curtail. Rather than discourage "the
sporting or game theory of justice," discovery has expanded both the scope and the
complexity of the sport ....
Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Characterof Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposalfor Change,
31 VAND. L. REv. 1295, 1303-04 (1978) [hereinafter Brazil, Adversary Character];see also, e.g., Edwin
W. Green & Douglas S. Brown, Back to the Future: Proposalsfor Restructuring Civil Discovery 26

U.S.F. L. REv. 225 (1992) (criticizing expensive and unworkable civil discovery system which has failed
to facilitate access to information or end ambush at trial); Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating Abusive
Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It Again Time for Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155, 155-56 (1991)
(disagreeing that additional rule-making will ameliorate discovery problems); Federal Rule 26
Amendments: Wrong Medium for Discovery Problems, 58 DEF.COuNS. J. 454, 455 (1991) (criticizing
new proposed disclosure requirements as adding significant systemic costs without concomitant systemic
benefits).
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Mandating more detailed disclosures or providing for interrogatories and
depositions will only serve to exacerbate the problems of the already underresourced and o'vertaxed criminal justice system. 9 Thus, even though the
framework created by the Allen procedures is incomplete, adding to that framework
only increases systemic costs without significant benefits to the fair and efficient
administration of.justice. In light of the claims of many observers that discovery
abuses are a majcr cause of delay and added expense in the civil system,"° new
legislation creating more formalized criminal discovery procedures is particularly
unwise and fiscally unsound.
In addition, the more formalized criminal discovery becomes the less likely it will
be utilized effectively by counsel representing the indigent or near-indigent
defendant."0 ' Making discovery more difficult or more expensive to obtain
increases the gap in the quality of representation provided wealthy and indigent
defendants."° Indigent defendants and those able to obtain counsel for a modest
retainer would be unable to afford to schedule depositions. Undoubtedly, the State
will balk at bearing the cost of defense requested depositions."n Yet, making these

99. No knowledgeable observer of the criminal justice system can deny that the system lacks the
resources to cope with the increasing demands made on all of the system's players. See, e.g., RICHARD
KLEIN & ROBERT SPANGENBERG, THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS (1993); ABA SECTION ON CRIMINAL
JUSTIcE, CRIMINAL JU-TICE IN CRISIS: A REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE AMERICAN BAR
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTHE UNITED STATES (1988).
100. In recent years there have been numerous articles detailing the widespread abuse of civil
discovery procedures and the increasing imposition of sanctions. See, e.g., Dudley, supra note 50;
BROOKINGS TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAYS
INCIVIL LITIGATION 6-7 (1989); Louis Harris & Assocs., Inc., Judges' Opinions on ProceduralIssues:
A Survey of State and FederalTrialJudges Who Spend at LeastHalf Their Time on General Civil Cases,
69 B.U. L. REV. 731 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635 (1989);
David 0. Stewart, The Year of Sanctioning Litigants, 77 A.B.A. J. 34 (1991). See supra note 98.
101. Ironically, Justice Brennan's call for more liberal discovery in criminal cases in his often-quoted
article, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Questfor Truth?, was prompted largely by his
recognition of the need to offset the imbalance of power between the State and lawyers representing the
poor. See Brennan, Quest for Truth?, supra note 47, at 285.
102. Some defendants, especially drug kingpins and white collar defendants, can afford investigators
and other defense exlx rts who enable them to wage a vigorous defense. See Genego, supranote 54, at
787,797; KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATORNEYS AT WORK
5 (1985). In contrast, many defense lawyers are constrained by serious resource problems which limit
their zeal and effectiveness. Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor
in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 581, 901 (1986-87); LUBIN, supra note 72, at 5863. See supra note 54.
As Justice Brennan noted in his seminal article on discovery in criminal cases, "we must all agree that
the opportunity for discovery on equal terms should either be the right of all accused, or the right of
none." Brennan, Quest for Truth?, supra note 47, at 282.
103. The discovezy bills introduced in the 1993 legislative session generally required the requesting
party to pay discover, costs. Although § 9 of House Bill 1530 did provide that if a defendant "is
indigent and without funds to pay the cost of reproduction of the required items, the cost shall be paid
by the Indigent Defender System," it did not specify that deposition costs were covered. H.R. 1530, 44th
Leg., 2d Sess. § 9 (011a. 1993). Similarly, § 9 of Senate Bill 117 contained almost identical language
requiring the Indigent Defense System to pay copying, duplication, and reproduction expenses. S. 117,
44th Leg., 1st Sess. § 9 (Okla. 1993). Even if indigents are given the right to freely utilize depositions,
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discovery tools available, but not providing defendants who are indigent or barely
able to afford counsel the means to utilize such tools, raises serious equal protection
and due process concerns."
Not only would it be too costly to reorder the criminal system to mirror the civil
system, such an effort ignores basic differences in the two systems. A criminal trial
is a search for truth, but that search is subject to constitutional constraints not
applicable in civil casesY Because of the constitutional guarantees afforded all
criminal defendants, the two sides in a criminal case are not governed by the same
rules. 1" Indeed, unlike civil litigants, the advocates in the criminal justice system

many Oklahomans of extremely limited means are found not indigent and compelled to exhaust their
resources merely to retain counsel. See Rodney J.Uphoff, The Right to Appointed Counsel: Why
Defendants in Oklahoma Still are Unrepresented, 64 OKLA. B.J. 918, 926 (1993). These defendants
would not be able to avail themselves of the discovery procedures afforded the State and other criminal
defendants.
104. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) ("There can be no equal justice where the
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77
(1985) (stating that fundamental fairness dictates indigent defendants be provided with the "basic tools
of an adequate defense"). For a discussion of the adverse effects of the high costs of discovery on
litigants with small civil cases, see Green & Brown, supranote 98, at 231.
105. The Oklahoma legislature would do well to heed the warning of Justice Douglas who
reminded the majority in Wardius that the growth of discovery devices may be hailed by some as a
"salutary development" but that development has altered the balance struck by the Constitution.
The Bill of Rights does not envision an adversary proceeding between two equal parties.
If that were so, we might well benefit from procedures patterned after the Rules of the
Marquis of Queensberry. But, the Constitution recognized the awesome power of
indictment and the virtually limitless resources of government investigators. Much of the
Bill of Rights is designed to redress the advantage that inheres in a government
prosecution. It is not for the court to change that balance.
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
The civil defendant does not enjoy the same protections afforded a criminal defendant Thus, the
defendant in a civil case cannot refuse to answer incriminating questions or decline to submit to a
deposition. See Graham v. Miracle, 556 P.2d 605 (Okla. 1976) (ruling that a defendant in civil cause of
action could not refuse to testify absent valid Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). But
the United States Constitution sets limits on how far a state legislature can go in mandating procedures
designed to further the search for truth.
Therefore, even if the legislature were to permit discovery depositions, the legislature could not
require that the defendant submit to a deposition. As Justice Brennan observed, "it remains true that the
privilege against self-incrimination prevents full discovery of a defendant's case, so that, for example,
if a rule were adopted permitting depositions in criminal cases, it could not require the defendant to
submit to being deposed by the prosecutor or to answer interrogatories." Brennan, ProgressReport,
supra note 87, at 5.
106. Charles Wolfram states:
The most striking difference between a prosecutor and a defense lawyer or any
nongovernmental lawyer is that the prosecutor is much more constrained as an advocate.
The assigned objective of a partisan advocate is to obtain litigational success for his or
her client, to 'win'. The prosecutor's required objective is emphatically different. It is to
secure the result, whether conviction or acquittal, indicated by a good faith inspection of
the facts and the law.
WoLFRAM, supra note 29, § 13.10.4. "The prosecutor cannot assume the same role vis-a-vis the state
that defense counsel assumes vis-a-vis the client; he cannot concentrate solely on an adversary role and
adopt the degree of partisanship characteristic of attorneys in civil proceedings." NATIONAL PROSECUTION
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are assigned different roles reflecting their different missions.
The prosecutor, as a minister of justice, must try to secure convictions while at
the same time seeing to it that justice is served."° The criminal defense lawyer has
no such mandate. The role of the criminal defense lawyer is to zealously represent

the defendant by vigorously testing the accuracy and credibility of the State's
witnesses." "In this respect, as part of our modified adversary system and as part

of the duty imposed on the most honorable defense counsel, we countenance or
require conduct which in many instances has little, if any relation to the search for
truth." 1 9
Many criminal defense lawyers readily embrace their responsibility to provide
zealous representation. High caseloads, inadequate resources, or financial
disincentives do limit the zeal of some defense lawyers."' But almost all criminal
defense lawyers share a view of their role which rejects the notion that defense
counsel is obligated to assist the State in any way in successfully prosecuting
counsel's client. Thus, defense counsel's sense of partisanship reinforces the system's

traditional protections provided all criminal defendants. It is not surprising,
therefore, that Oklahoma criminal defense lawyers begrudgingly comply - and in
as limited as fashion as possible -

with Allen's disclosure obligations."'

STANDARDS Standard 13.5 commentary, at 177 (Nat'l District Attorneys Ass'n 1977) (citing Frye v. State,
218 P.2d 643 (Okla. 1950)); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of ProsecutorialTrial
Practice: Can Prosecvtors Do Justice?. 44 VAND. L. REv. 45, 89 (1991) (stating that the "obligation
to do adversarial justice thus imposes limits on the prosecution that do not apply fully to the defense").
Compare ABA STANDARDS 4-7.6 (1991) (permitting defense counsel to attempt to discredit the truthful
witness through cross-examination) with ABA STANDARDS 3-5.7(b) (1992) (stating that a prosecutor may
not utilize cross-examination to discredit a truthful witness).
107. OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.8 cmt. (1993); ABA STANDARDS 3-1.2(c)
(1992). Recalling Justice Sutherland's often-quoted description of the prosecutor's special role in Berger
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), Justice Douglas observed that "[tjhe function of the prosecutor
under the Federal Constitution is not to tack as many skins of victims as possible to the wall. His
function is to vindicate the right of people as expressed in the laws and give those accused of crime a
fair trial." Donnelly v. DeChristofaro, 416 U.S. 637, 649 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). For a similar
description of the role of the Oklahoma prosecutor, see McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1221 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1988). In practice, however, it is frequently difficult for even the most conscientious
prosecutor to be simultaneously a zealous advocate and a minister of justice. For an excellent analysis
of the ambiguity of thi!; directive to "do justice" and the difficulties prosecutors have in adhering to this
command, see Zachari3s, supra note 106.
108. See ABA STANDARDS 4-1.2 (1991); see, e.g., Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318
(1981) (positing that drfense counsel best serves the public by advancing the interests of the accused).
109. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,258 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part). For the full tctxt, see supra note 29.
110. See supra notes 54, 99 and accompanying text. The Oklahoma Indigent Defense System,
created in 1991, utilizes contracts with private attorneys to deliver defense representation to most of the
State's indigent defendants. Because the contract system being used creates an economic disincentive for
those lawyers to hire investigators, it is questionable that the overall quality and zeal of indigent defense
representation has been significantly improved under the Indigent Defense System. A full examination
of the problems of the delivery of defense services in Oklahoma is beyond the scope of this article. For
a preliminary look at some of the problems of the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System, see Uphoff, supra
note 103.
111. Most defense lawyers adhere to the view expressed by Justice Black in Williams v. Floridathat
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Despite the theoretical differences in their roles, many prosecutors approach their
prosecutorial tasks with the same single-minded partisanship displayed by defense
counsel. "Prosecutors often find it difficult to restrain their advocacy or to
voluntarily make defense counsel's job easier."' Not surprisingly, then, there are
prosecutors who view their responsibility to provide only that discovery which,
using the most restricted definition possible, they must by law disclose and nothing
more. The Allen procedures permit prosecutors to adhere to an overzealous, unduly
partisan attitude."'

disclosure requirements such as those mandated by Allen are a "radical and dangerous departure from
the historical and constitutionally guaranteed right of a defendant in a criminal case to remain completely
silent, requiring the State to prove its call without any assistance of any kind from the defendant
himself." Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 108 (1970) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Even absent constitutional considerations, a lawyer's responsibilities as advocate and partisan do
not easily mesh with a corresponding duty to provide helpful information to the opposing party. See
Brazil, Adversary Character,supra note 98, at 1311, 1313-15, 1320-26, 1329-31; see also Brazil,
Lawyers' Views, supra note 86, at 829-39 (describing tactics lawyers use to minimize providing
information to other side). As Justice Scalia recently noted in criticizing several proposed changes to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which would impose on civil litigants a continuing duty to voluntarily
disclose certain information relevant to disputed facts, such a disclosure duty
does not fit comfortably within the American judicial system, which relies on adversarial
litigation to develop the facts before a neutral decision maker. By placing upon lawyers
the obligation to disclose information damaging to their clients - on their own initiative,
and in a context where the lines between what must be disclosed and what need not be
disclosed are not clear but requires the exercise of considerable judgment - the new Rule
would place intolerable strain upon lawyers' ethical duty to represent their clients and not
to assist the opposing side.
61 U.S.L.W. 4392, 4393 (Apr. 27, 1993). Justice Scalia's dissenting statement to the Court's order of
April 22, 1993, adopting amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is reprinted at 42 AM. U.
L. REv. 1513 (1993).
112. See, e.g., George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 Sw. U. L. REV. 98 (1975);
Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L.
197, 198-202 (1988). As Fred Zacharias observes, the vague ethical command to "do justice" places the
prosecutor in an ambiguous position. "Telling government lawyers that they sometimes must act
noncompetitively complicates their self-image; it eliminates their traditional adversarial benchmark .... "
Zacharias, supranote 106, at 103. Yet, because the minister of justice role is so vague and inherently
contradictory to the prosecutor's role as advocate, the prosecutor will minimize her responsibilities to "do
justice." It follows, therefore, that "[o]nce the pattern of prosecutorial behavior settles at a low ethical
level, institutional and peer pressure to obey a higher standard of conduct naturally will disappear." Id.
For examples of prosecutors whose remarks suggest unbounded zeal, see Marvin E. Frankel, The
Adversary Judge, 54 TEX. L. REv. 465, 470-71 (1976) ("Man's greatest experience is the act of
lovemaking. I sometimes wonder, if the moment when the jury foreman rises to utter those sweet words
of verdict - 'we the jury find the defendant guilty as charged' - is not as satisfactory an experience.");
Gershman, supra note 28, at 456 ("Any prosecutor can convict a guilty man; it takes a great prosecutor
to convict an innocent man.").
113. See Zacharias, supra note 106, at 70-73 (arguing that while "do justice" mandate compels
prosecutor to take some remedial action to prevent the systemic breakdown caused by an ineffective
defense lawyer, even ethical prosecutors generally resist the option of assisting defendants).
114. For an extended discussion of the systemic factors contributing to prosecutorial overreaching
and misconduct, see generally Gershman, supra note 28. This is not to say that prosecutors ought not
strike "hard blows" in seeking to secure convictions. Prosecutors as zealous advocates often are
warranted in striking hard blows. For a discussion of the importance of prosecutors carrying out their
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Although their roles are not the same, prosecutors and defense lawyers plainly

share a similar distaste for providing helpful information to the other side. Because
the culture in the civil system is similarly adversarial, it is not surprising to find that
civil lawyers engage in a variety of tactics to resist or withhold discoverable
information.'

Lawyers in the criminal justice system are as adept as their civil

counterparts in hide-the-ball tactics. Accordingly, disclosure provisions like those
mandated by Allen will not ensure access to information, but only increase the
expense and delay in the system as parties litigate disputed terms and struggle to
disgorge discovery from parties determined to provide as little information as

possible. An alternative solution is needed.
ProposedLegislation: Simple, Fair,and Cost-effective
In light of the general prosecutorial reluctance to assist the defendant by
providing the defense with easy and timely access to information and material in the

State's possession, the first and most cost-effective step the legislature must take to
improve the fair and efficient operation of the system is to impose a mandatory
open file policy on the prosecution. Such an obligation serves the systemic goals
identified by the ABA Standards"' and does so without any appreciable systemic

role as zealous advocates, see H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical
Standard: Guidancefrom the ABA, 71 MIcH. L. REv. 1145, 1159 (1973); Zacharias, supra note 106, at
56-57. Nonetheless, a prosecutors blows must be ethically sound, not "foul ones." See Berger,295 U.S.
at 88. Hindering or obstructing defense counsel's timely access to discoverable material is a low, and
often foul, blow. See ABA STANDARDS 3-3.11 (1992), 3-62 cmt. (1986); see also Giles v. Maryland, 386
U.S. 66, 98 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) ("No respectable interest of the State is served by its
concealment of information which is material, generously conceived, to the case, including all possible
defenses.").
115. According tc Brazil, "[tihe pursuit of victory psychologically dominates all other objectives
of litigation.... The means employed by litigators to achieve victory for their clients regularly involve
manipulating people and the flow of information in orderto present their clients' positions as persuasively
and favorably as possible." Brazil, Adversary Character,supranote 98, at 1311, 1313. Brazil describes
at length the obstructionist tactics taken by lawyers to avoid providing discoverable material to their
adversaries:
The dysfunctional effects that adversary pressures have on discovery are even more
obvious in the ways litigators respond to interrogatories, demands for documents, and
requests for admission. The principal goals of the responding attorney tend to be
completely adversarial: to provide as little information as possible, and to make the
process of acquiring that information as expensive and difficult as possible for the
opposing party and lawyer.
Id. at 1313; see also Brazil, Lawyers' Views, supra note 86, at 829; Dudley, supra note 50, at 191-98.
116. Standard 11-1.1 states that a discovery system should be designed to:
(i) promote an expeditious as well as a fair disposition of the charges, whether by
diversion, plea, or trial;
(ii) provide the accused with sufficient information to make an informed plea;
(iii) permit thorough preparation for trial and minimize surprise at trial;
(iv) reduce interruptions and complications during trial and avoid unnecessary and
repetitious trials by identifying and resolving prior to trial any procedural, collateral, or
constitutional i!;sues;
(v) eliminate as much as possible the procedural and substantive inequities among
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costs. There is no evidence to suggest that an open file policy will adversely affect

the State's ability to secure convictions. Perhaps in a limited number of the small
percentage of cases which are actually tried, a better informed and better prepared
defense lawyer will achieve an acquittal in a case which would otherwise have been
a conviction. Such a result only confirms the wisdom and fairness of the open file

policy, especially if the policy prevents the conviction of an innocent person.'11
Equally important, however, such a policy restricts the State's ability to secure

convictions by taking advantage of ill-prepared defense counsel.
Not only would a mandatory open file policy incree the adequacy of defense

counsel's representation, such a policy would substantially limit litigation in the trial
and appellate courts over discovery issues. Except in those instances in which the

prosecutor has sought and been granted a protective order,"' everything in the
prosecutor's possession and control would have to be logged in and promptly
provided to the defendant."9 A true open file policy would eliminate prosecutorial
nondisclosure on the grounds that certain material was not relevant or not
exculpatory. Simply put, all material in the prosecutor's file, save the lawyer's own
work product as narrowly defined," must be given to the defense. This also
assumes, of course, that the mandated open file policy requires prosecutors to
establish appropriate procedures with those investigative agencies with whom the
prosecutors regularly work so that all discoverable material, in fact, is turned over
to the prosecutors.'

similarly situated defendants; and
(vi) effect economies in time, money, judicial resources, and professional skills by
minimizing paperwork, avoiding repetitious assertions of issues, and reducing the number
of separate hearings.
ABA STANDARDS 11-1.1 (1986).

117. See Lee, supra note 4, at 457 (arguing that a major reason for requiring an open file policy is
to lessen the possibility of innocent people being wrongly convicted). See infra note 125 and
accompanying text.
118. If the legislature decides to fashion a new discovery code, it should include a provision
authorizing the court to grant a protective order restricting or conditioning discovery upon a showing of
good cause by either party. See ABA STANDARDS 11-4.4, 11-4.6 (1986); see also Uphoff, supra note
3, at 439.
119. See Uphoff, supra note 3, at 434 n.242 (noting that the prosecutor may have to make special
provisions for the unrepresented defendant or the indigent defendant to ensure that access to discovery
is provided in an inexpensive, meaningful manner).
120. See ABA STANDARDS 11-2.6 (1986).

121. See, e.g., People v. District Court, 793 P.2d 163, 163-67 (Colo. 1990) (holding that a
prosecuting attorney shall ensure flow of information maintained between investigating personnel and
district attorney's office); ABA STANDARDS 11-2.2 (1986). A prosecutor has a constitutional duty to
preserve evidence that the prosecutor expects might play a significant role in a suspect's case. California
v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488 (1984). A prosecutor does not have a duty to pursue all leads which
ultimately may produce evidence helpful to the defense. United States v. Gallo-Roman, 816 F.2d 76 (2d
Cir. 1987). On the other hand, "[a] prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence because
he or she believes it will damage the prosecution's case or aid the accused." ABA STANDARDS 3-3.1 l(c)
(1992); see, e.g., Owens v. Foltz, 797 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that the prosecution's failure to
investigate may be violative of due process because it is tantamount to suppression of evidence). A
prosecutor cannot faithfully discharge her ethical responsibilities merely by searching for exculpatory
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If, as mandated. prosecutors readily and fully complied with a mandatory open
file policy, the sytemic benefits would be enormous." " Enabling defense counsel
to have easy access to more information should ensure that counsel is better able
to assess defendant's case and lead to more informed plea bargainipg. It may, in
fact, lead to fewer trials as defense counsel can more realistically apprise the
defendant of the risks of proceeding to trial. Moreover, some untenable or weak

cases undoubtedly would be identified and resolved sooner possibly saving prosecutorial resources, but definitely saving judicial time. Furthermore, it would eliminate
reliance on the preliminary hearing primarily as a discovery proceeding thereby
substantially reducing the number and length of those hearings. This too would save
prosecutorial and judicial resources.'
The reliability of the trial process also would be enhanced by providing the
defense access to the prosecutor's entire file." Obviously, the system benefits

greatly if, by improving the defendant's ability to prepare for trial, fewer innocent
people are wrongly convicted."z Even if the prosecution loses a few more cases
in which the defendant was "probably guilty" because the defense effectively utilizes
discovery material to successfully challenge the State's case, such results confirm
and reinforce the basic values of the adversary system."r Convictions are to be

evidence in her own file. Rather, a prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory material includes a duty to
search possible sources for information and that duty to search extends to files of other law enforcement
agencies. United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Perdomo, 929
F.2d 967, 970-71 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Auten, 632 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Carey v. Duckworth, 738 F.2d 875,
878 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[A] prosecutor's office cannot get around Brady by keeping itself in ignorance, or
compartmentalizing information about different aspects of a case.").
122. Prosecutorial noncompliance would be a violation of the OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDuCr Rule 3.4(a) (1993). Prompt action by the courts and the Oklahoma Bar Counsel against
prosecutors who withheld discovery surely would discourage future noncompliance. Although
commentators have chided disciplinary agencies for their lax treatment of prosecutors who have failed
to disclose exculpatory e.vidence, see, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, DisciplinarySanctions Against Prosecutors
for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REv. 693 (1987), violation of a straightforward
mandatory policy preients an easier case for disciplinary action. See infra notes 129-31 and
accompanying text.
123. For a further discussion of the systemic benefits of eliminating the need to use preliminary
hearings for basic discovery purposes, see Lee, supra note 4, at 459-61.
124. The entire fife, however, does not include a prosecutor's legal research or that part of any
written documentation containing the prosecutor's opinions, theories or conclusions.
125. As Justice H.xlan declared, it is a "fundamental value determination of our system that it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372
(1970) (Harlan, J., conzurring). There is no question but that at times, an innocent person is wrongly
convicted. The unanswered - and empirically unanswerable - question is how widespread is this
unfortunate result. For a thought-provoking study which examines this problem by reviewing a series
of 350 death penalty cases in which, the authors contend, innocent people were convicted, see Hugo A.
Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriagesof Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv.
21 (1987).
126. "Society win; not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our
system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly." Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) ("The very premise
of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best
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secured in accordance with fair procedures that provide criminal defendants due
process. Indeed, the State should not be permitted to benefit by concealing material
evidence from the defense. Convictions of "probably guilty" defendants obtained
because their defense lawyers were "kept in the dark," "ambushed" or simply
inadequately prepared blemishes rather than benefits the criminal justice system."n
A mandatory open file provision also is a more efficient and less costly
legislative solution to the serious problem of inadequate investigative resources for
those defense lawyers representing defendants with limited or no assets."'
Unquestionably, the overstrapped defense lawyer operating without the assistance
of an investigator will be hard-pressed to mount much of an investigation. Without
access to information about the State's case, defense counsel's preparation and
performance suffer and the reliability of the outcome of the criminal process
becomes subject to question. Thus, the simple step of mandating that a prosecutor's
file be open should improve the performance of some defense lawyers and
significantly decrease the number of legitimate claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel and prosecutorial misconduct resulting from discovery-related problems. 9
To ensure that this mandatory open file policy is fully complied with and that
other required disclosures are made, the legislature also must create a specific
statutory penalty to be assessed against a lawyer in a criminal case who fails to
provide or divulge the required discovery. Giving the trial judge the ability to
impose a financial sanction directly against the offending lawyer greatly increases
the likelihood that appropriate discovery will be provided.' This assumes, of

promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.").
127. As the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has long recognized:
It matters not what the officers may think of the guilt of a defendant, the law presumes
that he is innocent until his guilt has been legally pronounced by an impartial jury in a
fair trial. It matters not how humble, poor, or friendless he may be, or how strong and
influential the feeling against him, it is his absolute right to have a fair opportunity to
prepare for trial and to present his defense. The law is not hunting for victims or seeking
to offer up vicarious atonements. Punishment should never be inflicted as such before a
conviction, and there should be no conviction, unless it be legally established to the
satisfaction of the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of the
crime charged against him. No attempt to railroad any man to the penitentiary or to the
gallows, it matters not how guilty he may be, should for one moment be tolerated by any
court. If a defendant cannot be convicted without denying him a reasonable opportunity
to prepare for trial and a fair trial, he should not be convicted at all. Any other rule would
make a myth of justice and a snare and delusion of courts.
State ex rel. Tucker v. Davis, 130 P. 962, 964 (1913).
128. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. This does not mean, however, that the creation of
a mandatory open file policy eliminates the need to increase resources for the defense for investigative
and expert services. See ABA STANDARDS 5-1.4 (1990) (stating that support services necessary for an
adequate defense should be available to all defendants who are unable to afford it themselves).
Improving easy access to the State's evidence, however, will significantly reduce the amount needed to
adequately fund such services.
129. Brennan, Quest for Truth?, supra note 47, at 286-87.
130. Financial sanctions against lawyers have not necessarily worked in civil cases, in part because
in certain cases the enormous judgements at stake encourage lawyers to engage ii "hardball" and "hide
the ball" tactics even in the face of monetary sanctions. See Dudley, supra note 50, at 191. Prosecutors
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course, that the penalty provision is kept simple and easy to employ.'
A conscientious prosecutor will want to review all the law enforcement reports
which are reasonably related to a particular offense. A mandatory open file policy
will require that all of these reports be made available to the defense. Accordingly,
if a prosecutor fails to obtain all the investigative material reasonably related to a
particular offense and make it readily available to the defense in a timely manner,
the prosecutor would be subject to a monetary sanction. A prosecutor's good faith
would not excuse her failure to make a report available to the defense, but it should
mitigate the severity of the penalty to be imposed.' Excusing prosecutorial negligence would defeat the very purpose of the sanction provision - compelling
lawyers to take se..iously their disclosure obligations. Assuredly, those prosecutors
who purposefully hide or conceal discoverable material should be subject to even
harsher discipline as should any defense lawyer who engages in such tactics.
A more subtle, but much more pervasive tactic which significantly interferes with
the ability of both the prosecution and the defense to prepare for and present each's
case is the deliberate attempt to discourage a witness from talking to the other
side. Such a tF.ctic serves only to frustrate or prevent one's opponent from
uncovering evidence and to make that opponent easier to ambush. The desire or
need to win will drive lawyers at times to engage in tactics that simply cannot be
tolerated because such conduct compromises the proper functioning of the adversary
system.
Prospective witnesses are not partisans; they should be regarded as
impartial spokesmen for the facts as they see them. Because witnesses
do not 'belong' to either party, it is improper for a prosecutor, defense
counsel, or amyone acting for either to suggest to a witness that he not

on fixed salaries, however, are likely to be very responsive to a financial penalty which they would have

to pay.
131. Defense counsel must be permitted to resist disclosures on constitutional grounds without
risking the imposition of a monetary sanction. Nevertheless, a defense lawyer who engages in dilatory
tactics as in Morgan should be sanctioned as well as subject to contempt and a disciplinary action.
Morgan v. District Court, 831 P.2d 1001, 1005 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
132. It also is essential that the mandatory open file policy not allow a prosecutor to screen reports
and then to tum over only "relevant" reports. Such a policy would invite the same type of narrow
construction of what is "relevant" as is now the case with the term "exculpatory." See Gershman, supra
note 28, at 449-51. Moreover, such a policy defeats two key goals of the open file policy; the elimination
of needless litigation over what must be disclosed and the facilitation of defense review of material which
counsel may deem to te potentially exculpatory. See Brennan, ProgressReport, supra note 87; see also
Dennis v. United Statcs, 384 U.S. 855, 874-75 (1966) (stating that defense counsel in best position to
review voluminous gr-and jury testimony to determine possible use by defense).
133. See supranote 57 and accompanying text. Any lawyer who seeks to discourage a witness from
testifying or blockades a witness from an adversary runs a serious risk of contempt, disciplinary action
or even criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Harlan v. Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1260 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S.Ct. 94 (1993) (holding that ex parte communications which restrict the flow of discovery by
"planting implied threzts in the minds of potential witnesses" threaten the integrity of the proceedings);
North Carolina State Bar v. Graves, 274 S.E.2d 396 (N.C. 1981) (finding that defense lawyer acted
unethically by attempting to influence potential witness not to testify); see also WOLFRAM, supra note
29, § 12.4.2.
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submit to an interview by opposing counsel. It is not only proper but
it may be the duty of the prosecutor and defense counsel to interview
any person who may be called as a witness .... "
Although existing ethical rules'35 and case law'36 already forbid prosecutors
and defense lawyers from instructing witnesses not to talk with the other side, too
many witnesses, either explicitly or implicitly, receive those exact instructions.'37
Surely the best method for eliminating this problem would be for both prosecutors
and defense lawyers to tone down their excessive partisanship and behave in
accordance with established ethical directives.' 38 Absent a significant change in the
present adversarial climate, the mere prospect of disciplinary action is unlikely to
deter or to curb excessive partisanship.'39
The legislature, therefore, should amend title 21, section 546 of the Oklahoma
Statutes to specifically provide that a prosecutor, defense lawyer, or any person in
an investigative capacity for either side in a criminal case would be guilty of a
misdemeanor for requesting that a witness refrain from voluntarily giving
information to the other side. Consistent with Rule 3.4(f) of the Oklahoma Rules
of Professional Conduct, the defendant and any relative, employee, or agent of the
defendant would not be included under the statute. By creating a specific offense,
the legislature would send a clear and direct message to lawyers that neither they
nor their agents'"' could create obstacles for their opponents by volunteering
134. State v. Simmons, 203 N.W.2d 887, 892 (Wis. 1973); see also ABA STANDARDS 3-3.1(d)
(1992).
135. OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.4(a), (f) (1993).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 989 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Carrigan, 804
F.2d 599 (10th Cir. 1986); Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 865 (1969); In re Blatt, 324 A.2d 15 (N.J. 1974).
137. See supranote 57 and accompanying text. See also State v. York, 632 P.2d 1261, 1263-65 (Or.
1981) (finding prosecutor acted improperly in advising witnesses of negative consequences of talking
with the defense and that "it would be better if they didn't say anything"); People v. Steele, 464 N.E.2d
788 (IIl. App. Ct. 1984) (recognizing that although prohibited from advising persons with relevant
information to refrain from talking with defense, prosecutor could advise potential witness of right to
decline to speak to defense).
138. For a discussion of many facets of the problem of prosecutorial misconduct and of a proposed
solution involving the creation of an independent watchdog, see Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical
Prosecutorsand Inadequate Discipline, 38 Sw. L.J. 965 (1984); see also Gershman, supra note 28, at
455-58 (urging that the present overzealous prosecutorial attitude be replaced by a new professional ethos
consistent with prosecutor's role as minister of justice).
139. For a discussion of the deficiencies of existing disciplinary mechanisms in curbing prosecutorial
misconduct, see, e.g., Rosen, supra note 122; Gershman, supra note 28. Numerous commentators have
observed that despite widespread prosecutorial misconduct disciplinary authorities rarely initiate
disciplinary action against a prosecutor. See WoLFRAmI, supra note 29, § 13.10 n.48; Edward M. Genson
& Marc W. Martin, The Epidemic of ProsecutorialMisconduct in Illinois: Is It Time To Start
Prosecutingthe Prosecutors? 19 Loy. U. CHn. L.J. 39, 56 (1987); Zacharias, supranote 106, at 49, 10507. For a discussion of the reasons bar grievance agencies are hesitant to seek discipline against
prosecutors, see Albert W. Alschuler, CourtroomMisconduct by Prosecutorsand Trial Judges, 50 TEx.
L. REv. 629, 670-73 (1972). Defense lawyers, however, are a more vulnerable and frequent target of
disciplinary actions and criminal prosecution for interfering with witnesses or obstruction the State's
access to evidence. See Zacharias, supra note 106, at 104-07.
140. A defense lawyer may well be held responsible for improper advice given out by an
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advice to a witness that cooperation with the other side is unwise. Finally, such a
statute also must include a provision requiring that any explanation given to a
witness concerning a witness's options be given in a neutral manner so as not to
discourage communication with the other side.'"
In addition to creating a statutory provision discouraging "game playing" with lay
witnesses, the legislature should include in any new discovery legislation a provision
increasing pretrial access to the experts each party intends to call at trial.' Under
the Allen procedures, expert reports must be turned over to the other side, but
prosecutors and defense lawyers can avoid disclosure merely by instructing their
experts not to prepare a report. 43 Further, both the State and the defense can
severely restrict the ability of one's opponent to meaningfully prepare for crossexamination by requesting their experts to keep their reports short and conclusory."

investigator acting on behalf of the lawyer. See OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule
5.3 (1993). A lawyer plainly cannot utilize another to circumvent an ethical rule. Id. Rule 8.4(a). Thus,
defense counsel may be held accountable if counsel's investigator attempts to influence a witness not to
testify or to testify falsely. See, e.g., In re Allen, 344 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1959). Similarly, the prosecutor is
responsible for the activities of law enforcement officers acting at his or her behest. See Evans v. Kropp,
254 F. Supp. 218, 222 (E.D. Mich. 1966); United States v. Ryan, 903 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973); ABA STANDARDS 33.1(c)(d) (1992).
141. Certainly a prosecutor or police officer should be able to respond to a witness's inquiry
regarding her options if approached by the defense, but any explanation must be couched in neutral
terms. See United States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 933-34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935 (1978).
Defense lawyers and investigators are in a more difficult position and must be very careful to provide
only a brief explanation and then caution the witness that they cannot render any legal advice because
of their role as counsel for the accused. See OKLAHOMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 4.3
(1993) (stating that in dealing with an unrepresented person, "[a] lawyer shall not give advice to such
a person other than the advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are, or have a reasonable
possibility of being, in conflict with the interests of the client"). Like the prosecutor, defense counsel can
provide a brief neutral explanation of a witness's rights as long as counsel does not influence or advise
that witness how to exercise those rights. See McNeal v. Hollowell, 481 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). But see State v. Martindale, 527 P.2d 703 (Kan. 1974) (censuring defense
lawyer for truthfully telling State witnesses not required to wait at courthouse if not subpoenaed); United
States v. Fayer, 523 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding defense counsel's motive "corrupt," thus counsel
was guilty of obstructing justice for advising represented person not to voluntarily appear at grand jury
investigating lawyer's client). Absent a corrupt motive, a defense counsel may inform a prospective
witness of the witness' right against self-incrimination. Wolfram, supra note 29, § 12A.2; ABA
STANDARDS 4-4.3(c) (1991).
142. See Uphoff, :upra note 3, at 431, 437. For an excellent discussion of the need to provide
pretrial access to experts, including those offering nonscientific evidence, see Linda Eads, Adjudication
by Ambush: Federal Prosecutors' Use of Nonscientific Experts in a System of Limited Criminal
Discovery, 67 N.C. L. REV. 577 (1989).
143. Allen, 803 P.2d at 1168. Both Oklahoma discovery bills, House Bill 1530 and Senate Bill 117,
also only require reports to be disclosed. But see In re Serra, 484 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1973) (affirming
the trial court's order finding a defense lawyer in contempt for instructing expert to deviate from normal
practice and not prepare a report so as to avoid having to disclose report to the prosecutor).
144. In Allen v. State, the defense counsel complained about the conclusory nature of the expert's
report and the failure to provide him the expert's work papers. Although the court agreed that defendant's
complaint had some merit, it declined without explanation to expand Allen to require such disclosures.
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It is not enough merely to have access to an expert's report or a brief summary
of the expert's testimony. The absence of detailed information about a prospective
expert's testimony allows for surprise, frustrates counsel's ability to prepare and
increases the likelihood of an unreliable result at trial by hampering counsel's ability
to challenge the expert on cross-examination. The need for such pretrial access is
especially great given the highly technical, novel, or complex nature of much expert
testimony, which can only be understood and challenged by a lawyer who is
adequately informed and prepared.145
The new discovery code, therefore, must ensure that defense lawyers and
prosecutors have full access to all experts who will testify at trial. Full access
includes any report or statement made by an expert in connection with the particular
case, along with the result of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests
comparisons, or experiments. Even if a report is not prepared, counsel should be
required to provide the name and address of each expert witness expected to testify
together with a statement detailing the expert's proposed testimony. This statement
should set forth the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is
expected to testify as well as a summary of the grounds for each opinion and the
names of any other experts on whom the testifying expert is relying to support his
or her conclusions.' 46
Full access also should include the right of both -the prosecutor and defense
counsel to depose the other side's expert witnesses. 47 The complexity as well as
persuasive power of expert testimony demand that lawyers be given as much
opportunity as possible to prepare in order to challenge such testimony. 4 ' Hence,
the added systemic costs of permitting this tool seems warranted in the case of
expert witnesses. This assumes, of course, that indigent defendants are guaranteed
equal access to discovery depositions.' 9

Allen v. State, 862 P.2d 487, 491 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
145. See Miller v. State, 809 P.2d 1317, 1319 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (observing that in order to
be able to provide "effective" assistance of counsel, defense lawyer needs "time to prepare, time to
consult with experts and time to be ready for effective cross-examination of the State's expert"). For a
good summary of the preparation necessary to effectively cross-examine an expert, see J. ALEXANDER
TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAW, TACTICS AND ETHICS 333-66 (2d ed. 1993).

146. See Uphoff, supranote 3, at 431, 437 (proposing disclosure provision modeled after FED. R.
Civ. P. 26).
147. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 517:13 (1991) (specifically granting either party in a felony case
the right to take a discovery deposition of any expert who may be called to testify by the other party).
My position on the merits of discovery depositions of experts has changed since my earlier article. See

Uphoff, supra note 3, at 431 n.232; see also Eads, supra note 142, at 622 (arguing that courts should
be given discretion to permit discovery depositions).
148. Social science research and most trial lawyers agree that expert testimony can be highly
persuasive and difficult to combat. See, e.g., Allan Raitz, Edith Greene, Jane Goodman & Elizabeth F.
Loftus, The Influence of Expert Testimony on Jurors' DecisionMaking, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 385,
390 (1990).
149. See supranote 103-04; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 (providing depositions only in exceptional
circumstances but ensuring that if taken at the behest of a defendant "unable to bear the expenses of the
taking of the deposition, the court may direct that the expense of travel and subsistence of the defendant
and the defendant's attorney for attendance at the examination and the cost of the transcript of the
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As in the case of lay witnesses, both parties should be precluded from discouraging their experts from talking with the other side. 5 This holds particularly true
for the prosecutor given the superior access to expert assistance the State possesses
in most criminal cases.' If lawyers are able to informally talk with the other
side's experts it may eliminate the need for some depositions and persuade the
lawyers in other cases to reconsider the strength of their case. Moreover, it does not
follow that allowing an opponent to talk with one's experts will necessarily
adversely affect a lawyer's own case. Finally, if improved access does, in fact,
permit a lawyer to successfully attack the other side's experts, the search for truth
plainly has been advanced.
Although the prosecutor should have equal access to the experts intended to be
used by the defense, that access should not extend to an expert hired by the defense
as a consultant. If the defense expert is not going to be called as a witness, the
defense is under no obligation to reveal to the State information learned from that
expert. As the court acknowledged in Richie v. Beasley," the disclosure requirements for the State and defense are distinctly different." Just as defense counsel
need not disclose the names of fact witnesses counsel uncovers but chooses not to
call, the defense cannot be required to disclose the names of experts used when
counsel does not intend to call such witnesses to testify."
On the other hand, the State should be required to inform the defense of the
names and addresses of persons who performed tests, experiments, or comparisons
in connection with the case even though the prosecution does not intend to call such
persons at trial. In addition, the prosecutor should be compelled to disclose the
report of such an expert, or, if no report was prepared, a summary of the experts
findings. Although :uch information is likely to be in the prosecutor's file and, thus,
discoverable pursuant to the mandatory open file policy, a specific provision
requiring such a disclosure - even if the expert only orally reported to the
prosecutor - will ensure compliance.

deposition shall be paid by the government").
150. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text. See also Schindler v. Superior Court of
Madem County, 327 P.2d 68, 73-74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (holding that the state improperly urged
pathologist not to cooperate with the defense).
151. See Wardius v, Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 476 n.9 (1973) (recognizing that the State has greater
resources to investigate and scientifically analyze evidence).
152. 837 P.2d 479 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
153. Id. at 480.
154. Id. Consultations between defense counsel and a defense expert are protected by both the
"work product" doctrine and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422
U.S. 225 (1975); Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1987); State v. Mingo, 392 A.2d 590 (N.J.
1978). In some instance3, however, the prosecutor may be permitted to call at trial an expert initially
retained by the defense. See, e.g., Noggle v. Marshall, 706 F.2d 1048 (6th Cir. 1983). A full discussion
of this issue is beyond the scope of this article.
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Conclusion
55

In an earlier article,' I argued that the Allen procedures were constitutionally
suspect in that they undercut constitutional protections afforded the criminally
accused by the adversary system. That article further warned that gaps in the Allen
procedures would spawn increased litigation, uncertainty, and widely disparate
handling of discovery problems." Although many of the article's predictions have
come to pass, the article did not foresee the extent to which the rebuttal witness
exception would provide the prosecution such a significant tactical advantage. The
article concluded by urging the legislature to adopt a proposed discovery code for
Oklahoma substantially modeled on the ABA Standards," which provides fair and
efficient pretrial access to information within a framework cognizant of the differing
obligations and rights of the two sides in a criminal case.
The legislature has not, as of yet, enacted any discovery code. The bills under
consideration last session, however, would have created procedures which
substantially mirror the Allen procedures."' If the legislature is committed to
devising a fair and efficient system, it must avoid following Allen's lead and resist
the push to remake the criminal adversary system more like the civil system.
Rather, the legislature should enact a criminal discovery code which fosters pretrial
access to information instead of encouraging prosecutors and defense lawyers to
play costly discovery games.
A simple discovery code modeled on the ABA Standards together with the
statutory amendments suggested in this article facilitates pretrial access to
information and the fair resolution of cases before trial, but without dramatically
increasing the costs of securing that information. Trial preparation will be enhanced
and undue surprise or ambush will be minimized. In turn, trial reliability will be
improved without compromising the constitutional rights of the accused or radically
altering the adversary system.
If the legislature decides, despite the costs, to follow the road taken by the Allen
court, then I would urge the legislature to take only a few steps down that road.
More formalized procedures, together with discovery depositions, only should be
mandated for capital cases. Because "death is different,"'59 the cases are more
likely to be tried, often involve expert witnesses and generally are fought more
vigorously both at the trial and appellate levels. Moreover, because every aspect of
a capital case is already going to be contested on appeal, the courts will have ample
opportunity to review the workings of the new discovery code without generating
new appeals. Thus, limiting the procedures to capital cases would provide the

155. Uphoff, supra note 3.
156. Id. at 401,426.
157. Id. at 428-41.

158. See supra note 96.
159. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (stating that "death is a punishment
different from all other").
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legislature an opportunity to study the merits of a new code without the expense and
systemic disruption of implementing the code for all criminal cases."W
Indeed, it is time for the legislature to act, but it cannot afford to enact a code

based on Allen that is inefficient, costly, skewed in the prosecutor's favor, and
susceptible to abuse. Instead, the legislafure must create criminal discovery
procedures that balance fairness and efficiency while respecting the constitutional
framework that has served this society so well for so long.

160. It could be argted that, given the stakes involved, capital cases present the worst cases for
experimenting with new discovery procedures. If, however, more formalized procedures are to be tested
on the premise that, despite the costs, they will lead to better lawyering and more accurate results, then
capital cases, above all others, wanant such procedures.
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